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By Richard K John, Columbia University
Historians of the United States have for many decades termed the late
nineteenth century the "Gilded Age." No consensus exists as to when this
period began and ended, or how it might best be characterized. Most textbook
authors place the origins of the Gilded Age around 1877 and its demise
around 1900. Few would deny that this period witnessed a host of epochal
innovations that included the rise of the modern industrial corporation,
the building of large-scale technical systems, including the electric power
grid, and the creation of governmental institutions that were conducive to
rapid industrialization. Yet the significance of these innovations remained
a matter of dispute. This essay contends that no synthetic account of the
late nineteenth-century United States that aspires to be at all comprehensive
can ignore these innovations—innovations that have come to be known by
various names such as the "managerial revolution," the "Second Industrial
Revolution," and "modernization."1 It further contends that the reluctance of
some of the most respected historians of business, technology, and political
economy to embrace the Gilded Age construct raises questions about its
utility as a periodizing device.2
'Robert J. Gordon, "Does the 'New Economy' Measure up to the Great Inventions of the
Past?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (Autumn 2000): 49-74.
2To be sure, the Gilded Age construct is not without its defenders even among historians
of business, technology, and political economy. The social historian—turned—business histo-
rian Richard White has recently invoked it in a nonincidental way, as did the legal historian
Michael Les Benedict. Even so, its most resolute champions remain social and cultural histo-
rians interested primarily in social relationships and cultural values. These include social his-
torian Richard Schneirov and cultural historian Alan Trachtenberg. For White, the construct
underscored the centrality of financial speculation to railroad-building (the Gilded Age as
an age of speculative finance); for Benedict, the continuing vitality of the common law (the
Gilded Age as a "golden age"). Schneirov, in contrast, used it to highlight the emergence of
capital-intensive corporations (the Gilded Age as the first chapter in American capitalism);
Trachtenberg used it to highlight the moral bankruptcy of business culture (the Gilded Age
as institutionalized hypocrisy). Richard White, "Information, Markets, and Corruption: Trans-
continental Railroads in the Gilded Age," Journal of American History 90 (June 2003): 19-43;
Michael Les Benedict, "Law and Regulation in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era" in Law as
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The reluctance of historians of business, technology, and political economy
to conceive of the late nineteenth century as a Gilded Age is manifested in
their reluctance to characterize the people responsible for these innovations
as "gilders." Historians of the 1790s routinely write about the "federalists,"
while historians of the 1900s have long tried to identify precisely who
deserves to be regarded as "progressive." Historians of the late nineteenth
century, in contrast, have failed to reach a consensus as to what to call its
dramatispersonae, let alone what made them distinctive.
In one sense, this is unsurprising. The magnitude of the late nineteenth-
century innovations in business, technology, and political economy were so
enormous, and their effects so far reaching, that it would seem unlikely that
a single group of people could have brought them about. Indeed, it may
well be the very momentousness of this transformation that helps to explain
why the "Gilded Age" construct has proved so enduring. The construct is
so open-ended, and its meaning so vague, that it can embrace a variety of
phenomena.
To be sure, there has long been a consensus among social and cultural
historians that a more or less coherent group—long known as "businessmen"
or, more recently, the "bourgeoisie"—dominated center stage. Yet with a few
notable exceptions, in describing this group, historians who do not specialize
in business, technology, or political economy tend to fall back on language
that has changed little since the 1930s, when journalist Matthew Josephson
published his muckraking expose of "robber barons."3 Popular journalists
are, if anything, even more inclined toward hyperbole: "The Age of Betrayal"
screamed one recent analysis of the "The Triumph of Money in America,
1865-1900."4
Historians of business, technology, and political economy have long
regarded the popular fascination with the machinations of late nineteenth-
century businesspeople with mixed emotions. On the positive side, it has
goaded textbook authors into including at least a thumbnail sketch of certain
well-known businesspeople. Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, and John D.
Rockefeller are so well known that it would seem foolhardy to leave them out.
Indeed, there may well be no other period in U.S. history in which textbook
authors find themselves obliged to include at least a cursory discussion of what
son, WI, 2000), 227-63; Richard Schneirov, "Thoughts on Periodizing the Gilded Age: Capital
Accumulation, Society, and Politics, 1873—1898," Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era
5 (July 2006): 189-224; Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the
Gilded Age (New York, 1982).
'Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1865—1901 (New
York, 1934); Josephson, The Politicos, 1865-1896 (New York, 1938).
























476 Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era / October 2009
specific businesspeople actually did. Contemporaries reached an analogous
conclusion. "It is a notorious fact," declared Maryland congressman David
J. Lewis in 1914, articulating a common view, "that since the Civil War the
history of our country has not been the narrative of social institutions, but
a stirring story of the gigantic achievements of individuals in the domain
of private finance." It was easier to remember a half-dozen of this era's
financiers, Lewis lamented, than to recall the names of the presidents of the
United States.5
On the negative side, all this attention has come at a cost. In no other
period in U.S. history is the actual conduct of businesspeople more likely to
be caricatured. At least part of the problem can be traced to the propensity
of historians who do not specialize in business, technology, and political
economy to characterize the late nineteenth century as the Gilded Age. This
construct implies that this period was distinctive, if not unique, in the extent to
which it was characterized by vulgarity, materialism, and political corruption.
And more often than not, these evils are blamed on businesspeople—they
set the tone for public life, or so it is assumed. The phrase "Gilded Age,"
it is worth remembering, is the only widely used periodization that that is
unambiguously pejorative—even "Cold War," after all, has its defenders.
Yet was, in fact, the late nineteenth century uniquely vulgar, materialistic,
and corrupt? This question is rarely asked, yet a plausible case can be made
that it was not. The vulgarity of the 1870s greatly troubled journalists such
as E. L. Godkin and Henry Adams; many decades later, the entire period
between 1865 and 1900 earned the opprobrium of cultural critics Van Wyck
Brooks and Lewis Mumford. Indeed, it was Brooks and Mumford who in
the 1920s popularized the notion that the late nineteenth century had been a
"Gilded Age."6 (Though the phrase "Gilded Age" had been coined by Mark
Twain and Charles Dudley Warner in a satirical novel that they published in
1873, it remained largely confined to this novel and the play based on it until
Mumford and Brooks decided that this phrase best captured the spirit of the
age.)
That Godkin, Adams, Brooks, and Mumford found late nineteenth-
century public life vulgar is hard to dispute. Yet should we take them at
word? The late nineteenth century witnessed the establishment of a large
number of notable cultural institutions that included art museums, concert
halls, and public libraries. Is the Brooklyn Bridge a lesser achievement than
Pennsylvania Station? Is Central Park inferior to Mount Auburn Cemetery?
^Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Jan. 19, 1914), 1797.
'On the considerable and often pernicious influence of E. L. Godkin's editorials on Ameri-
can historical writing, see William M. Armstrong, "Godkin's Nation as a Source of Gilded Age
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Questions like these highlight the perils of relying on aesthetic criteria in
venturing historical claims. Few eras in U.S. history have escaped ridicule
on aesthetic grounds—yet fashions change. Mumford, for example, hailed
the Chicago skyscraper as a harbinger of modernity while deriding the New
York skyscraper as a throwback to the past. While Mumford's assessment
was conventional wisdom for several decades, a more recent generation
of cultural historians have rendered a very different verdict. The Chicago
skyscraper, cultural historians now contend, was not only more ornamental
(or "gilded") than Mumford presumed; in addition, it typically had little
relationship with the buildings in its immediate environs—a serious defect
in a postmodern age.7
Was the late nineteenth century uniquely materialistic? Here too, the verdict is
mixed. No one would deny that many late nineteenth-century businesspeople
craved luxury, built ostentatious mansions, and lavishly invested—often at
the insistence of their wives—in expensive furniture, clothing, and art. Yet
did this really set them apart from businesspeople in the early republic? Or,
for that matter, did it distinguish them in a fundamental way from wealthy
Americans in any decade from the seventeenth century to the present? The
nouveaux riches, after all, have always been with us. In Tocqueville's America, not
only English visitors but also American social critic James Fenimore Cooper
bewailed the commercial excesses of mushroom aristocrats; similar critiques
have been leveled at the 1920s, the 1950s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. What
historian would seriously entertain the proposition that the late nineteenth
century was the only epoch in which large numbers of Americans yearned
to get rich quick? Indeed, in at least one sense, late nineteenth-century
businesspeople may well have been more civic-minded than the "overclass"
of today. After all, with a few notable exceptions, they invested their money
in the United States rather than abroad.
Similar objections can be raised with respect to the textbook conceit that
public life in the late nineteenth century was uniquely corrupt. Once again, one
wonders, compared to what? Lawmakers in the 1850s have been persuasively
characterized as a "plundering generation"; a similar epithet could be hurled
at the Jacksonians in the 1830s, the Republicans in the 1920s, or lawmakers
from either party in any decade. The administration of James Buchanan
(1857—61) was, in retrospect, no less corrupt than the administration of
Ulysses S. Grant (1869—77)—Credit Mobilier notwithstanding.8 It may well
'Daniel Bluestone, Constructing Chicago (New Haven, 1991), 105-08, epilogue; Thomas
Bender and William R. Taylor, "Culture and Architecture: Some Aesthetic Tensions in the
Shaping of Modern New York City" in Visions of the Modern City: Essays in History, Art, and
Literature, ed. William Sharpe and Leonard Wallock (Baltimore, 1987), 189-219.
"Mark Summers, The Plundering Generation: Corruption and the Crisis of the Union, 1849—1861
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require a willing suspension of disbelief to characterize late nineteenth-
century lawmakers as high-minded moralists, yet this conclusion has been
cogently defended by one of the most judicious of the current generation of
political historians.9 And if one shifts one's gaze from the federal government
to the states and municipalities, then the administrative achievement of the
age becomes even more impressive. Here, or so the historians of state and
municipal governments have long contended, lay the cradle of the modern
administrative state.10
Even if one concedes that the late nineteenth century was, in certain
respects, vulgar, materialistic, and corrupt, one additional problem with
the Gilded Age construct remains. And this is the problem of agency. The
very reluctance of historians to inquire as to who the "gilders" might be has
encouraged the presumption that the period witnessed an epochal struggle
between the many and the few. Despite the best efforts of business historians,
historians of technology, and historians of political economy to demonstrate
the diverse and often antagonistic interests of the business elite, even gifted
scholars routinely assume that the late nineteenth-century business elite was
more or less monolithic and that reform impulses came not from within, but
from without—and, in particular, from farmers and workers."
This stark people-versus-the-interests duality has made it hard to appreciate
the extent to which the business elite was itself divided. Two examples will
make my point. The characterization of rapacious businesspeople as "robber
barons" originated with and was popularized not by farmers and workers, but
by the consummate insiders C. F. Adams Jr., and Josiah Quincy Jr. Adams
and Quincy were both scions of prominent revolutionary-era families. Like
many businesspeople, they derided certain business practices of railroad
leaders Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jay Gould.12 The antimonopoly movement,
similarly, received its principal inspiration not from the radical journalist
in the Age of Grant (Ithaca, NY, 1985). For an attempt to measure corruption, see John Joseph
Wallis, "The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History" in Corruption and Reform:
Lessons from America's Economic History, ed. Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin (Chicago,
2006), 23-62.
'Charles W Calhoun, "The Political Culture: Public Life and the Conduct of Politics" in
The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, ed. Calhoun (Lanham, MD, 2007),
239-64.
"William R. Brock, Investigation and Responsibility: Public Responsibility in the United States, 1865—
1900 (New York, 1984); Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America,
1870-1900 (Baltimore, 1984).
"Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bour-
geoisie, 1850-1896 (New York, 2001); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Pro-
gressive Age (Cambridge, MA, 1998), ch. 4, and Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," Reviews
in American History 10 (Dec. 1982): 123-24.
12Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilisation (New York 1949), 3:23; "The
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Henry George, but, rather, from merchants and shippers outraged at the
prices that telegraph and railroad managers were charging them to move
information and goods.13
The one-dimensional characterization of the late nineteenth-century
business elite is, in part, a product of the disinclination of business historians
and historians of technology to pay more than incidental attention to the most
hated businessperson of the age: the financier. For the novelist Theodore
Dreiser, the financier was the archetypal businessman. For business historians
and historians of technology, he remains, with a few exceptions, a cipher.
The most notorious nineteenth-century financier was Jay Gould. Though
the main contours of Gould's career have long been well known, he appears
only as a bit player in Alfred D. Chandler's Visible Hand, still the single most
penetrating analysis of American business in the late nineteenth century. For
Chandler, the late nineteenth century was neither a Gilded Age—a phrase
he rarely used—nor an age that could be justly characterized as marking
the triumph of "finance capitalism." Rather, in Chandler's view, the period
witnessed a managerial revolution spearheaded largely by middle managers,
a cohort of businesspeople whom contemporaries rarely demonized and
historians previously ignored.14 Chandler credited Gould with twice forcing
railroad leaders to build huge horizontal combines, but not much else. He
ignored, for example, Gould's conviction that the value of corporate securities
should be based on their future earning power rather than their sunk cost,
a radical idea in Gould's day, yet a commonplace one today. Today Gould is
sometimes hailed as a pioneering venture capitalist; Chandler, in contrast, did
not treat him as indispensable to the period's momentous restructuring of
the economy.15
If Chandler marginalized financiers, the historian of technology
Thomas P. Hughes displaced them. Unlike Chandler, Hughes had little
quarrel with Matthew Josephson's characterization of late nineteenth-
century businesspeople as rapacious and narrow-minded robber barons, a
"David Nasaw, "Gilded Age Gospels" in Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in
a Democracy, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 123-48; George H.
Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws (Madison, WI, 1971): Lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, and
Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850-1887 (Cambridge, MA, 1955).
"Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, MA, 1977). For a related discussion, see Richard R. John, "Turner, Beard, Chan-
dler: Progressive Historians," Business History Review 82 (Summer 2008): 227—40.
''Charles R. Morris, The Tycoons: How Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and]. P.
Morgan Invented the American Supereconomy (New York, 2005). For a more judicious position,
which credits Gould with kind of innovations that Alfred D. Chandler Jr. ascribed to corpo-
rate managers, see Maury Klein, The LJfe and Legend of Jay Gould (Baltimore, 1986), and Albro
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characterization that Chandler emphatically rejected.16 Indeed, as David
Hounshell has elegantly demonstrated, Hughes's analysis of the late
nineteenth-century business corporation presupposed a Veblenian duality
between business and industry.17 The corporation, in Hughes's view, was a
mere component of the large technical system; only after system-builders like
Thomas Edison and Samuel Insull had already laid the foundations of the
modern electrical grid would venal financiers convince them to overreach.18
Chandler marginalized financiers, and Hughes displaced them. The
historian of political economy Richard Bensel, in contrast, localized them
in a distinctive, sectionally based political economy. Bensel's financiers were
a tiny minority of the electorate who lacked a popular mandate. Even so, by
artfully navigating the treacherous shoals of national politics, they attained a
major objective: retention of the gold standard. The Gilded Age construct,
in Bensel's view, obscured their achievement, since it exaggerated the
nationwide reach of what was, in fact, a tiny, largely New York—based elite.
Cross-class, sectionally based political alliances, Bensel believes, defined the
late nineteenth-century political economy, a reality obscured by the notion of
a Gilded Age.19
This survey of historical writing on business, technology, and political
economy demonstrates, I hope, that the Gilded Age has outlived its
usefulness. It is almost always a mistake to view an era in relationship to
the era it preceded, rather than the era that it followed. Yet despite the best
efforts of certain of its defenders, the Gilded Age seems destined to remain
inexorably linked not only with the Progressive Era and a cultural critique
launched in the 1920s, but also with the New Deal-era revaluation of the
late nineteenth-century political economy. The distinctiveness of the late
nineteenth century will remain obscure so long as we view it through such a
distorting lens. It is time, in short, to drop the Gilded Age from the historian's
lexicon and to write a history of the late nineteenth century that is as richly
variegated as die age itself.
"Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm,
1870-1970 (New York, 1989).
17David A. Hounshell, "Hughesian History of Technology and Chandlerian Business Histo-
ry: Parallels, Departures, and Critics," History and Technology: An International journal12:3 (1995):
205-24.
18Thomas P. Hughes, "From Firm to Networked Systems," Business History Review 79 (Au-
tumn 2005): 587-93.
"Richard Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialisation, 1877-1900 (New York,
2000); Richard Bensel to Richard R. John, personal communication. The intellectual historian
George M. Fredrickson has reached an analogous conclusion: The "Gilded Age" construct
was deficient and should be abandoned because it left out the South; Fredrickson, "Nine-
teenth-Century American History" in Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past, ed.
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